UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-7-2014

State v. Hillbroom Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41533

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hillbroom Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41533" (2014). Not Reported. 1672.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1672

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

OPY

No. 41533
City of Sandpoint
Bonner Co. Case No.
CR-2012-4705

JUNIOR LARRY HILLBROOM,

)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________ )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNER

HONORABLE DEBRA HEISE, Magistrate Judge
HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDIE, District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

WILLIAM M. BERG
Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd.
414 Church Street, Ste. 203
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-4748

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDAN~APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................... 1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ............................................. :...................................................... 4
Hillbroom Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate
Court's Non-Compliance With The Expiration Date
Requirement Of I.C.R. 46.2 Rendered The No-Contact
Order Void .............................................................................................4
A.

lntroduction .................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... .4

C.

A Court's Non-Compliance With I.C.R. 46.2 Does
Not Render A No-Contact Order Void ......................................... 5

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................... 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987) ............. 8
Joynerv. State. 2014 WL6634131 (Idaho App. March 27, 2014) ......................... 7
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) .............................. .4, 5
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981) ...................................... 5
State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387 (2008) ............................................ 6
State v. Cobler, 48 Idaho 769,229 P.3d 374 (2010) .......................................... 6, 9
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................. 4
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 80 P.3d 1103 (Ct. App. 2003) .............................. .4
State v. Schwab, 153 Idaho 325,281 P.3d 1103 (Ct. App. 2012) .......................... 8
State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 25 P.3d 859 (Ct. App. 2001) ............................... 9
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004) ............................................ 4, 8

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-918(2) ..................................................................................................... 5
I.C. § 18-920 ................................................................................................. 5, 6, 7

RULES
I.C.R. 1 .................................................................................................................. 7
I.C.R. 46.2 ................................................................................................... passim
I.R.C.P. 54 ............................................................................................................. 8
I.R.C.P. 65 ............................................................................................................. 8

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Junior Larry Hillbroom appeals from the district court's order affirming the
magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June 2012, the state charged Hillbroom with felony domestic battery
and attempted strangulation. (Idaho Data Repository, Ada County Case No. CR2012-02908.) The magistrate court presiding over Hillbroom's arraignment on
the charges entered a no-contact order between Hillbroom and Candice Fournier,
the alleged victim.

(R., p.32.)

The magistrate court did not enter a specific

expiration date on the order. (See id.) Hillbroom did not object to this omission,
nor did he move to modify the no-contact order on the ground that it lacked an
expiration date.
In September 2012, a member of the Bonner County Sheriff's Office's
Victim Advocate Service Team observed Hillbroom and Fournier together inside
of a vehicle in the Bonner County courthouse parking lot. (R., pp.25-26, 31.) A
responding

officer arrested

Hillbroom,

and the state charged him with

misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order. (R., pp.25-37.)
Prior to trial, Hillbroom moved to dismiss the violation of a no-contact order
charge on the ground that the underlying no-contact order lacked an expiration
date as required by I.C.R. 46.2, and was therefore void. (R., pp.72-86.) The
magistrate court denied the motion, concluding: (1) the court's practice of
omitting specific expiration dates on no-contact orders until and unless the

1

defendant is convicted of the underlying charge complied with I.C.R. 46.2; and
(2) even if the no-contact order violated the expiration date provision of I.C.R.
46.2, the order was still valid. (R., pp.115-125.)
A jury found Hill broom guilty of violation of a no-contact order. (R., p.126.)
The magistrate court imposed 60 days jail with 55 days suspended, credit for one
day served, with 32 hours on the sheriff's labor program to be served in lieu of
the the remaining four days jail, and two years probation. (R., p.127.) Hillbroom
appealed to the district court. (R., pp.139-140.)
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the
magistrate court's denial of Hillbroom's motion to dismiss.

(R., pp.169-175.)

The district court held that while the magistrate court erred in concluding that the
non-contact order complied with the expiration date requirement of I.C.R. 46.2,
this non-compliance did not render the order void.
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., pp.176-178.)
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(Id.)

Hillbroom timely

ISSUE
Hillbroom states the issue on appeal as:
As a matter of law, can the State prove the crime of violation of a no
contact order where the no contact order is defective because it
fails to comply with the mandatory requirement to set out the
order's expiration date?
(Appellant's brief, p.5)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Hillbroom failed to show that the magistrate court's non-compliance
with the expiration date requirement of I.C.R. 46.2 rendered the no-contact order
void?
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ARGUMENT
Hillbroom Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate Court's Non-Compliance With
The Expiration Date Requirement Of I.C.R. 46.2 Rendered The No-Contact
Order Void

A.

Introduction
Hillbroom contends that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate

court's denial of his motion to dismiss his charge of violation of a no-contact
order. (See generally. Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Hillbroom contends that the
magistrate court's failure to include an specific expiration date on the underlying
no-contact order rendered it void, and thus precluded his subsequent conviction.
(Id.)

Hillbroom's contention fails because while the magistrate court's non-

compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 provided him grounds to modify the no-contact order,
it did not render the order void.

B.

Standard Of Review
The court on appeal exercises free review over the application and

construction of a statue, State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106
(Ct. App. 2003), and of a criminal rule, State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d
314, 316 (2004) (citations omitted).
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision."

State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.

2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
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substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kt.

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kt_ (citing Losser, 145
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981 )).

C.

A Court's Non-Compliance With I.C.R. 46.2 Does Not Render A NoContact Order Void
Idaho Code § 18-920 permits entry of a no contact order "[w]hen a person

is charged with or convicted of' certain delineated offenses including felony
domestic battery, I.C. § 18-918(2).

Section 18-920 does not impose any

particular requirements on the form of the order.

Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2,

however, does contain requirements for no contact orders issued pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 18-920. Specifically, Rule 46.2 provides, in relevant part:
No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following
information:
(1)

The case number, defendant's name and victim's name;

(2)

A distance restriction;

(3)
That the order will expire at 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or
upon dismissal of the case;
(4)

An advisory that:

(a)
A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until
an appearance before a judge, and the possible penalties for this
crime,
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(b)
The no contact order can only be modified by a judge,
The no contact order will remain in effect until further order of the
court, and
(c)
A subsequent domestic violence protection order will
supersede the no contact order.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that I.C.R. 46.2 requires all no-contact
orders to contain a specific expiration date. State v. Cobler, 48 Idaho 769, 771773, 229 P.3d 374, 377-378 (2010) (reversing a magistrate court's denial of a
defendant's motion to modify a no-contact order where the order lacked a
specific expiration date); see also State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387
(2008) (discussing the rationale and policy reasons behind the I.C.R. 46.2
expiration date requirement).
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that while the magistrate
court's failure to include a specific expiration date in the no-contact order was
contrary to I.C.R. 46.2, this non-compliance did not render the order void. (R.,
pp.169-175.) A review of the applicable law and relevant policy considerations
supports the district court's determination.
First, neither the express language of I.C. § 18-920 nor of I.C.R. 46.2
compels a conclusion that a no-contact order is rendered void if any of the
information required by I.C.R. 46.2 is missing or incorrect.

Indeed, in order to

prove a violation of a no contact order, the state is only required to prove: the
defendant "has been charged or convicted" of one of the delineated offenses, "[a]
no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho criminal rule,"
that "[t]he person charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person in
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violation of an order," and that before such contact, the defendant had notice of
the order.

I.C. § 18-920(2)(a), (b), (c); ICJI 1282. The state is not required to

prove that the order satisfied all aspects of I.C.R. 46.2. The Idaho Criminal Rules
govern all criminal "proceedings" (I.C.R. 1), but cannot add required elements to
criminal statutes.
Consistent with these principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently held
that another requirement of I.C.R. 46.2, that no-contact orders contain notice of
the potential penalties for violating the order, does not "create an element of the
offense or a condition precedent for the prosecution of the violation of a nocontact order." Joyner v. State. 2014 WL 6634131 *3-4 (Idaho App. March 27,
2014).

In Joyner, a post-conviction petitioner who had been convicted of

violating of a no-contact order asserted his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the validity of the underlying order on the ground that it did
not comply with the notice of penalties requirement of I.C.R. 46.2.

&

The Court

of Appeals held that Joyner failed to show prejudice because such a challenge
would not have been successful.

&

("To be sure, if the legislature intended

Idaho Code § 18-920(2) to include as an element of the offense that Joyner be
advised of possible penalties and that the prosecutor prove proper advisement, it
could have done so in the statutory text. The plain language of section 18-920
does not impose such a requirement.").

Similarly, in the present case, the

magistrate court's lack of compliance with the expiration date requirement of
I.C.R. 46.2 did not preclude Hillbroom's subsequent prosecution for violation of a
no-contact order.
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has also addressed the impact of a court
order's lack of compliance with a court rule in the context of a contempt
proceeding in In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 580-581, 733 P.2d 795,
801-802 (Ct. App. 1987). In Reeves, an attorney advised his client not to comply
with a court's temporary restraining order that did not appear to comply with the
requirements of I.R.C.P. 65(g).

kl

The Court of Appeals affirmed Reeves'

contempt conviction, concluding, "an individual may not generally ignore a court
order with which he disagrees. Rather, he should draw the trial court's attention
to the alleged error. If his objections are overruled, he should seek certification of
the issue under I.R.C.P. 54(b) or otherwise pursue an orderly appeal."

kl

While Reeves concerned a contempt conviction, the factual scenario
described therein illustrates the policy considerations at play in the present case.
If, as Hillbroom asserts, a lack of compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 renders a nocontact order void, a felony domestic battery defendant could willfully stand silent
on such a technical defect, and, unbeknownst to the court, freely have contact
with his victim without fear of criminal prosecution.
The district court's conclusion in this case was also consistent with the
well-established line of Idaho cases holding that a defendant in one criminal case
may not collaterally challenge a judgment of conviction entered in a separate
criminal proceeding.

See State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004)

(holding that a defendant may only mount a collateral attack to a prior conviction
utilized to enhance a charge in a new case where the prior conviction was
obtained in violation of the constitutional right to counsel); State v. Schwab, 153
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Idaho 325, 281 P.3d 1103 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 25
P.3d 859 (Ct. App. 2001). While Weber, Schwab, and Warren concerned attacks
on prior judgments of conviction, the same policy considerations promoting the
"confidence in the integrity of [a court's] procedures" is also evident in the context
of no-contact orders entered in prior criminal cases.
Finally, as the district court recognized (R., pp.72-74), no Idaho appellate
court analyzing I.C.R. 46.2 has held that non-compliance with that rule renders a
no-contact order void.

In Cobler, the Idaho Supreme Court held only that the

magistrate court's failure to comply with the I.C.R. 46.2 expiration date
requirement entitled Cobler to a modification of the order. Cobler, 48 Idaho at
771-773, 229 P.3d at 377-378.
modification.

Hillbroom was similarly entitled to such a

He was not, however, entitled to violate the order and avoid

prosecution.
Hillbroom has failed to show that the the magistrate court's failure to
include a specific expiration date on the no-contact order rendered his no-contact
order void.

He has therefore failed to show that the district court erred by

affirming the magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
affirming the magistrate court's denial of Hillbroom's motion to dismiss.
DATED this 7th day of May, 2014

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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